neoplatonismo:plotino:tratado:34:13
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| + | ===== 34,13 (VI, 6, 13) — HÁ GRAUS NO UM ===== | ||
| + | <tabbox Míguez> | ||
| + | 13. ¿Cómo admitir, por ejemplo, que el pensamiento de la unidad del sujeto tiene su origen en el sujeto, en la percepción del hombre, en un ser vivo cualquiera o incluso en una piedra? ¿Podríamos considerarlo razonable cuando uno es el ser que se parece y otra y muy distinta su propia unidad? Porque de afirmarse la identidad del hombre con su unidad, no pensaríamos el uno relativamente a lo que no es el hombre. Además, en el caso de la posición a la derecha y en otras por el estilo, el pensamiento no se mueve en vano, sino que advierte una determinada posición cuando precisa lugares diferentes, lo mismo que ve alguna cosa cuando afirma la unidad. No es movido por una impresión vana, o simplemente por nada enuncia la unidad. Ni tampoco por el hecho de que se dé un objeto único y ningún otro con él; porque incluso al afirmar que "no hay otro objeto", | ||
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| + | Si esto se aprecia más cuando nos referimos a lo continuo o, aún mejor, a lo no divisible, queda de manifiesto que la unidad es una cierta naturaleza que posee la existencia. Porque no es posible que en lo que no es se dé algo en mayor o menor grado, a la manera como al afirmar la sustancialidad de cada una de las cosas sensibles e igualmente de las cosas inteligibles, | ||
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| + | Si, pues, no hay posibilidad de pensar (ni de decir) las cosas prescindiendo del número uno, del dos, o de cualquier otro, ¿cómo podríamos negar la existencia a eso sin lo cual no es posible pensar ni decir las cosas? Porque si el no existir (el uno) implica que no se puede pensar o decir nada, es claro que resulta imposible el decir que no existe; ya que lo que es de todo punto necesario a la producción del pensamiento o del lenguaje debe preceder necesariamente tanto al pensamiento como al lenguaje; ésa es la condición indispensable para que uno y otro se produzcan. | ||
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| + | Pero si la existencia del uno es necesaria para la existencia de cualquier ser (porque no hay ningún ser que no sea uno), no cabe duda entonces que el uno es antes que el ser y que incluso lo engendra. Por ello se dice ser uno, pero no ser y luego uno ; porque al decir uno y ser se produciría la multiplicidad. En el uno no comprendemos el ser si no hacemos expresa referencia a su propensión para engendrar el ser. La precisión del objeto, de este objeto, no es algo que carezca de sentido; enunciamos entonces una realidad y una cierta presencia, y no una impresión del alma que no responda a objeto alguno; se trata, sí, del objeto mismo, como si dijésemos el nombre propio de un determinado objeto. | ||
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| + | <tabbox Bouillet> | ||
| + | XIII. D' | ||
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| + | De même que, lorsque nous affirmons l' | ||
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| + | <tabbox Guthrie> | ||
| + | THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT ONE DOES NOT COME FROM THE SUBJECT ITSELF. | ||
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| + | 13. To begin with, it is unreasonable to insist that ithe notion of the subject one comes to us from the subject itself (which is one), from the visible man, for instance, or from some other animal, or even some stone. Evidently the visible man and the One are things entirely different, which could not be identified; otherwise, our judgment would not be able '(as it is) to predicate unity of the non-man. Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for the right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position when it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also sees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not experience there an affection that is vain, and it does not affirm unity without some foundation. It cannot be believed that the judgment says that an object is one because it sees that it is alone, and that there is no other; for, while saying that there is no other, the judgment implicitly asserts that the other is one. Further, the notions of " | ||
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| + | UNITY, THOUGH BY PARTICIPATION EXISTING IN SENSE-OBJECTS, | ||
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| + | Just as we predicate being of every sense-thing, | ||
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| + | <tabbox MacKenna> | ||
| + | 13. It cannot reasonably be thought that the notion of unity is derived from the object since this is physical - man, animal, even stone, a presentation of that order is something very different from unity ; if that presentation were unity, the mind could never affirm unity unless of that given thing, man, for example. | ||
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| + | Then again, just as in the case of "On the right" or other such affirmation of relation, the mind does not affirm in some caprice but from observation of contrasted position, so here it affirms unity in virtue of perceiving something real; assuredly the assertion of unity is not a bare attitude towards something non-existent. It is not enough that a thing be alone and be itself and not something else: and that very " | ||
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| + | Besides, that in us which asserts unity of some object is first a unity, itself; and the object is a unity before any outside affirmation or conception. | ||
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| + | A thing must be either one thing or more than one, manifold: and if there is to be a manifold there must be a precedent unity. To talk of a manifold is to talk of what has something added to unity; to think of an army is to think of a multitude under arms and brought to unity. In refusing to allow the manifold to remain manifold, the mind makes the truth clear; it draws a separate many into one, either supplying a unity not present or keen to perceive the unity brought about by the ordering of the parts; in an army, even, the unity is not a fiction but as real as that of a building erected from many stones, though of course the unity of the house is more compact. | ||
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| + | If, then, unity is more pronounced in the continuous, and more again where there is no separation by part, this is clearly because there exists, in real existence, something which is a Nature or Principle of Unity. There cannot be a greater and less in the non-existent: | ||
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| + | As Substance and Real Being, despite the participation of the sensible, are still of the Intellectual and not the sensible order, so too the unity observed present in things of sense by participation remains still an Intellectual and to be grasped by an Intellectual Act. The mind, from a thing present to it, comes to knowledge of something else, a thing not presented; that is, it has a prior knowledge. By this prior knowledge it recognises Being in a particular being; similarly when a thing is one it can affirm unity as it can affirm also duality and multiplicity. | ||
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| + | It is impossible to name or conceive anything not making one or two or some number; equally impossible that the thing should not exist without which nothing can possibly be named or conceived; impossible to deny the reality of that whose existence is a necessary condition of naming or affirming anything; what is a first need, universally, | ||
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