neoplatonismo:plotino:tratado:26:6
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| + | ===== 26,6 (III, 6, 6) — REFUTAÇÃO DA TESE ESTOICA SEGUNDO A QUAL O SER É CORPORAL ===== | ||
| + | <tabbox Baracat> | ||
| + | // | ||
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| + | 6. Foi dito que se deve considerar a essência inteligível, | ||
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| + | Primeiro, porém, é preciso que nós, que abordamos esse tema e falamos acerca da natureza da matéria, entendamos que a natureza do ente e a essência e o ser não são tal como pensa a maioria. Com efeito, o ente, o que verdadeiramente se pode chamar ente, é ente realmente; e isso é o que é completamente ente; isto é, aquilo em que nada se afasta do ser. Uma vez que o ente é perfeitamente, | ||
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| + | Se, pois, definimos o ente com esses termos - e o devemos, ou o intelecto e a vida não proviriam dele, mas seriam adventícios ao ente e proviriam do não-ente, e o ente seria sem-vida e sem-intelecto, | ||
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| + | E como pode a natureza dos corpos ser não existente? Como pode ser não existente a matéria sobre a qual se sustentam os corpos, as montanhas, as rochas e a terra toda, que é sólida? ? também todas aquelas coisas que são resistentes e que com seus golpes forçam as coisas golpeadas a reconhecer sua realidade? Se, então, alguém dissesse: "como podem ser entes e entes reais as coisas que nem pressionam, nem forçam, nem são resistentes, | ||
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| + | Creio, contudo, que as coisas que mais se bastam a si mesmas molestam menos as outras e são menos penosas para as outras, enquanto que as que são mais pesadas e térreas, porquanto são deficientes, | ||
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| + | <tabbox Míguez> | ||
| + | 6. Hemos de afirmar, pues, que el alma es impasible por su condición de sustancia inteligible, | ||
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| + | ¿Y cómo no ha de ser la naturaleza de los cuerpos y asimismo su materia? Las montañas y las rocas, la tierra entera, con todos los objetos sólidos y resistentes que atesora, y que se rechazan con fuerza en sus choques, dan fe de su existencia. Podríamos decir también: ¿cómo tienen la categoría de seres, y de seres reales, objetos que no nos presionan, ni nos ofrecen resistencia, | ||
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| + | Circunscribiéndonos a los cuerpos, menos (ser) se da en la tierra, que es inmóvil, que en un cuerpo más móvil y menos pesado, situado en lo alto; así, el fuego escapa ya a la naturaleza corpórea. A mi entender, cuanto más independientes son los cuerpos menos molestan y conturban a los demás; en tanto, los cuerpos más pesados y más terrestres, esto es, todos esos cuerpos defectuosos, | ||
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| + | Todo esto ha sido dicho contra los que ponen los seres en los cuerpos, apelando como prueba de su verdad al testimonio de los choques de los cuerpos y a los fantasmas., de la sensación. Obran, poco más o menos, cual esos soñadores que tienen como verdaderas todas las cosas que ven en sueños. Porque la sensación es algo propio del alma en sueños, y toda la parte del alma que se encuentra en el cuerpo se halla realmente en ese estado. La verdadera vigilia consiste en levantarse sin el cuerpo y no con él. Porque levantarse con el cuerpo es ir de un sueño a otro, limitandose a cambiar de lecho; levantarse verdaderamente es prescindir en absoluto de los cuerpos, los cuales, por ser precisamente de naturaleza contraria al alma, son también lo opuesto a ella en lo que concierne a la esencia. Eso atestigua su generación, | ||
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| + | <tabbox Bouillet> | ||
| + | VI. Nous avons suffisamment démontré l' | ||
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| + | Puisque nous sommes ainsi conduits à traiter de la nature de la matière, nous devons d' | ||
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| + | Si telle est la nature de l' | ||
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| + | Il semble donc que ce soit l' | ||
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| + | Voilà les objections que nous avions à faire à ceux qui regardent tous les êtres comme corporels, qui ne veulent juger de leur existence que par les impressions qu'ils en reçoivent, et qui essaient de fonder la certitude de la vérité sur les images de la sensation. Ils ressemblent à des hommes endormis qui prennent pour des réalités les visions qu'ils ont dans leurs rêves. La sensation est le rêve de l'âme (47) : tant que l'âme est dans le corps, elle rêve ; le véritable réveil de l'âme consiste à se séparer véritablement du corps, et non à se lever avec lui. Se lever avec le corps, c'est passer du sommeil à une autre espèce de sommeil, d'un lit à un autre ; s' | ||
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| + | <tabbox Guthrie> | ||
| + | INTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN FRAGMENT. | ||
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| + | 6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible " | ||
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| + | NONENTITY WILL HAVE INTELLIGENT LIFE ONLY AS BENEATH " | ||
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| + | Since we are thus led to treat of the nature of matter, we must first premiss that the nature of existence, " | ||
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| + | MATERIALISTS CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOLID EARTH IS NEAREST NONENTITY; AND WHY GREATEST EXISTENCE IS LEAST MATERIAL. | ||
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| + | Is such be the nature of existence, it could be neither body, nor the substrate of bodies; for their existence is nonentity. (Materialists, | ||
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| + | CORPOREITY IS NONENTITY BECAUSE OF LACK OF UNITY. | ||
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| + | It is therefore an " | ||
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| + | SENSATION AS THE DREAM OF THE SOUL FROM WHICH WE MUST WAKE. | ||
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| + | Such are the objections that may be raised against those who consider all beings as corporeal; who wish to judge of their existence only by impressions they receive therefrom, and who try to found the certitude of truth on the images of sensation. They resemble sleeping men who take as realities the visions they have in their dreams. Sensation is the dream of the soul; so long as the soul is in the body, she dreams; the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation from the body, and not in rising along with the body. To rise with the body is to pass from one sleep into another kind; from one bed to another; really to awake is to separate oneself completely from the body. The body, whose nature is contrary to that of the soul, consequently has a nature contrary to that of " | ||
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| + | <tabbox MacKenna> | ||
| + | 6. the Intellectual Essence, wholly of the order of Ideal-form, must be taken as impassive has been already established. | ||
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| + | But Matter also is an incorporeal, | ||
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| + | The Existent - rightly so called - is that which has authentic existence, that, therefore, which is existent completely, and therefore, again, that which at no point fails in existence. Having existence perfectly, it needs nothing to preserve it in being; it is, on the contrary, the source and cause from which all that appears to exist derives that appearance. This admitted, it must of necessity be in life, in a perfect life: if it failed it would be more nearly the nonexistent than the existent. But: The Being thus indicated is Intellect, is wisdom unalloyed. It is, therefore, determined and rounded off; it is nothing potentially that is not of the same determined order, otherwise it would be in default. | ||
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| + | Hence its eternity, its identity, its utter irreceptivity and impermeability. If it took in anything, it must be taking in something outside itself, that is to say, Existence would at last include non-existence. But it must be Authentic Existence all through; it must, therefore, present itself equipped from its own stores with all that makes up Existence so that all stands together and all is one thing. The Existent | ||
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| + | If we have thus rightly described the Authentic Existent, we see that it cannot be any kind of body nor the under-stuff of body; in such entities the Being is simply the existing of things outside of Being. | ||
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| + | But body, a non-existence? | ||
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| + | Yet even the corporeal realm witnesses for us; the resting earth has certainly a scantier share in Being than belongs to what has more motion and less solidity - and less than belongs to its own most upward element, for fire begins, already, to flit up and away outside of the body-kind. | ||
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| + | In fact, it appears to be precisely the most self-sufficing that bear least hardly, least painfully, on other things, while the heaviest and earthiest bodies - deficient, falling, unable to bear themselves upward - these, by the very down-thrust due to their feebleness, offer the resistance which belongs to the falling habit and to the lack of buoyancy. It is lifeless objects that deal the severest blows; they hit hardest and hurt most; where there is life - that is to say participation in Being - there is beneficence towards the environment, | ||
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| + | Again, Movement, which is a sort of life within bodies, an imitation of true Life, is the more decided where there is the least of body a sign that the waning of Being makes the object affected more distinctly corporeal. | ||
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| + | The changes known as affections show even more clearly that where the bodily quality is most pronounced susceptibility is at its intensest - earth more susceptible than other elements, and these others again more or less so in the degree of their corporeality: | ||
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| + | Thus far we have been meeting those who, on the evidence of thrust and resistance, identify body with real being and find assurance of truth in the phantasms that reach us through the senses, those, in a word, who, like dreamers, take for actualities the figments of their sleeping vision. The sphere of sense, the Soul in its slumber; for all of the Soul that is in body is asleep and the true getting-up is not bodily but from the body: in any movement that takes the body with it there is no more than a passage from sleep to sleep, from bed to bed; the veritable waking or rising is from corporeal things; for these, belonging to the Kind directly opposed to Soul, present to it what is directly opposed to its essential existence: their origin, their flux, and their perishing are the warning of their exclusion from the Kind whose Being is Authentic. | ||
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| + | <tabbox Taylor> | ||
| + | VI. That the intelligible essence, indeed, the whole of which is arranged according to form, is necessarily impassive, has been already shown. Since, however, matter also is something incorporeal, | ||
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| + | It may, however, be said, how is it possible the nature of bodies and matter should not have a being, in which these mountains and rocks exist, the whole solid earth, and all resisting substances ? Indeed, things which are struck, confess that their essence subsists by compulsion. If, therefore, some one should say, how is it possible that things which neither press, nor are impelled, nor resist, and which in short are not visible, viz. soul and intellect should be beings, and truly beings, — we reply, that among bodies, earth is most stable, but that which is more movable, is also less ponderous, and of this that which is on high is most movable. And hence, fire flies from the nature of body. I am of opinion, however, that things which are more sufficient to themselves, disturb others in a less degree, and occasion them less pain. But things which are more ponderous and terrene, because they are in a defective and fallen condition, and are unable to elevate themselves, strike against others, falling on them through imbecility, and oppressing them by their descending and sluggish weight. For dead bodies cause greater molestation1 when they fall, and strike and injure more vehemently. But animated bodies, as they participate of being, are the more innoxious the more they participate of it. Hence motion, which is a certain life as it were in bodies, and an imitation of life, is in a greater degree present with those things that have less of body, as if a defect of being rendered that with which it is present, more corporeal. From what are called passions, likewise, it may be seen, that what is in a greater body is more passive, earth than other things, and other things according to the same ratio. Foi other things when divided, return again into one, when nothing prevents them. But when a terrene body is divided, the parts always continue separate from each other, as being naturally averse to reunion, and by a small impulse are disposed to remain as they are impelled, and be corrupted. Hence, that which becomes body in a most eminent degree, as having especially arrived at nonentity, is incapable of recalling itself into one. Ponderous, therefore, and vehement concussions, | ||
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